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Abstract
This paper offers an approach to assessing quality of life, based on Sen's (1985)
theory, which it uses to understand loss in quality of life due to mobility
impairment. Specifically, it provides a novel theoretical analysis that is able to
account for the possibility that some functionings may increase when a per-
son's capabilities decrease, if substitution effects are large enough. We then
develop new data consistent with our theoretical framework that permits com-
parison of quality of life between those with a disability (mobility impairment)
and those without. Empirical results show that mobility impairment has wide-
spread rather than concentrated impacts on capabilities and is associated with
high psychological costs. We also find evidence that a small number of func-
tionings are higher for those with a disability, as our theory allows. The paper
concludes by discussing possible implications for policy and health assessment
methods.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Interest in the application of Sen's (1979, 1985, 2010) capability approach to health economics continues to grow follow-
ing earlier discussions in the literature about its capacity to change the informational basis of policy evaluation and
technology assessment (Culyer, 1989). Sen's approach was essentially developed as a constructive response to some of
the problems that economists and philosophers had identified in the theoretical foundations of welfare economics. It
argues instead for an account of quality of life that emphasises multidimensionality, the importance of what people are
free to do, a production function for quality of life that is based on resources and abilities and recognises that people
are heterogeneous in their abilities to generate quality of life. In this paper, we contribute to the problem of understand-
ing what happens when the capability approach is used to structure empirical analysis relevant to health economics by
providing novel evidence of a pattern of diverse capability deprivation for those with a mobility impairment. We also
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contribute to theory by providing a more general theoretical analysis of capabilities and their determinants than has
been discussed to date and use this to help interpret our empirical findings.
Within health economics, Anand (2005), Brouwer, Culyer, van Exel, and Rutten (2008), and Coast, Smith, and
Lorgelly (2008) have emphasised the theoretical promise that this approach offered to broaden the informational scope
of economic evaluations. As they note, welfarism restricts information to utilities, whereas extra-welfarism goes beyond
this by supplementing it with additional information about nongoods characteristics, such as whether individuals have
the freedom and ability to do everyday activities or are free from pain or happy. One of the key problems for Sen's
approach has been its operationalization. It emphasised the importance of human potential—what people are enabled
to do—and yet this seemed to be difficult to measure compared with the activities people engage in or states they experi-
ence. However, over the years, this has given rise to a growing body of research by economists on the value of autonomy
in health (Abadian, 1996; Ruger, 2010), safety nets for and prevalence and nature of disability (Burchardt, 2004; Kuklys,
2005; Mitra, 2006; Wolff & De-Shalit, 2007; Dubois & Trani, 2009),1 child development and the promotion of non-
cognitive skills (Heckman, 2007), global health governance and social justice (Ruger, 2004), women's quality of life in a
low income country (Greco, Skordis-Worrall, Mkandawire, & Mills, 2015), opportunities for exercise and health diets
(Ferrer et al., 2014), as well as the development of new measures of health status for evaluations such as the ICECAP
family of measures (Coast et al., 2008; Al-Janabi et al., 2013; Coast, 2014; Keeley, Al-Janabi, Lorgelly, & Coast, 2013) or
the OCAP/OXCAP family of measures developed by Simon et al. (2013) and Lorgelly, Lorimer, Fenwick, Briggs, and
Anand (2015).2
Our paper contributes to the practical use of the approach by developing data on the capabilities, functionings and
happiness of a group of adults with a disability and then using the data to explore what it might tell us about the quality
of life of this group. In addition, because we find that a small number of functionings increase with disadvantage
(e.g. sleeping during the day) in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour of inferior goods in conventional consumer
theory, we develop a theoretical framework that allows for this possibility. Our research question can be considered,
therefore, to be what can data (and theory) based on the capability approach to quality of life tell us about people with
disabilities? The paper is primarily a contribution to the health economics of quality of life measurement, particularly
from a capability perspective, but it is also relevant to work on disability more generally, or the operationalisation of
the Sen–Nussbaum approach to economics and social justice.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.1 offers an account of the capability approach focussing particularly on
the concept of capability and then develops some theory that makes a novel theoretical contribution to capability analy-
sis connecting it more generally with traditional consumer theory and that we use to structure our interpretation of
results. Section 2.2 describes the data categories that we populate on the basis of the theory described in 2.1. It also pro-
vides a valuation formula used towards the end of the empirical results section. Section 3 carries the results and descrip-
tive data comparing capabilities, activity involvement and subjective-wellbeing measures for people with a capability
impairment. We then report the results of regression models in which capabilities and subjective wellbeing depend on
mobility impairment as well as a range of other resource and conversion factors and use this to argue that the pattern
of capability deprivation is such that most capabilities are on average lower for those with a mobility impairment than
for those without; and, using a subjective valuation method, the costs appear significant. In Section 4, we discuss these
results, noting that our results indicate that workplace and other losses are important when measuring the true value of
health, that recent disability policy reform in Australia can be understood through a capability lens and that the subjec-
tive measures in this case appear to confirm significant quality of life loss associated with extensive capability depriva-
tion. We also suggest that whether these results could be described as being consistent with a utility approach is less
important than the fact that the approach provides a definition of quality of life that provides a rationale for collecting
such data and offers an agenda for further research.
1Economists working on health have emphasised that disability can profoundly impact the ability of people to convert resources into valued activities
or states and this paper provides an opportunity to complement the work of Trani, Bakhshi, Brown, Lopez, and Gall (2018) and to test the proposition
in a high-income country context.
2Following his widely cited International Health Economics Association (IHEA) presidential address published in this journal, Sen (2002), a wide
array of topics have been shown to be addressable with the approach including work on maternal health, Osmani and Sen (2003), disability
classification, Saleeby (2007), recovery in mental health, Hopper (2007), health inequalities and social determinants, Marmot et al. (2008), the value of
agency for health, Abel and Frohlich (2012), health and justice, Venkatapuram (2013), patient-centred care, Entwistle and Watt (2013), theoretical
foundations for health assessment, Bleichrodt and Quiggin (2013) and Brazier and Tsuchiya (2015), psychometric properties of health measures, Al-
Janabi et al. (2013), Hofmann, Schori, and Abel (2013), Vergunst et al. (2017) and ageing and quality of life Zaidi and Howse (2017). For a review of
applications of the Sen–Nussbaum capability approach in health see Mitchell, Roberts, Barton, and Coast (2017).
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2 | THEORY AND METHODS
2.1 | Theoretical framework
We start by developing a framework based on Sen (1985, pp. 11–14) that emphasises the importance of capabilities,
functionings (activities and states) and subjective wellbeing (e.g. ‘experienced utility’ or ‘happiness’) for quality of life
assessment. The freedom to choose things, in and of itself, is not well captured in traditional welfare economics. In par-
ticular, welfare economics makes no reference to how bliss points, identified with optimal baskets of goods and services,
are arrived at. In Sen's framework, and therefore in our analysis, we begin by emphasising the importance of what peo-
ple are enabled to do or be. We denote the set of all such activities and states that an individual i can achieve as the
set Qi, and note that conditional on a person's resources, and abilities to convert them, this can be a significant measure
of a person's wellbeing. This set can also be thought of as the outcome of a vector of production functions, denoted by
fi, of resources and personal abilities, ci. So, for the ith individual we can define the capability set:
Qi  f i, ;cif gwhere f i∈Rn: ð1Þ
Variations in personal abilities are central to disability, even in social models, and so, this framework is a promising
one with which to understand how disability impacts the production of quality of life.
A capability set specifies feasible activities3 that are achievable with given resources and personal characteristics.
We denote the functioning vector thus
f 0i = < f i,1 cið Þ, f i,2 cið Þ,   , f i,n cið Þ>∈Rn, ð2Þ
where n denotes the number of elements in the space of possible activities or states. The value of this vector depends on
the individual's ability to convert resources into activities, so in the analysis, we shall estimate equations consistent with
this. Finally, our framework includes a third equation denoting the amount of pleasure or happiness a person derives
from any particular vector of activities and states, which depends also on their resources and personal
characteristics, ci. We can represent this as
Ui = u f i,1, f i,2,   , f i,n,ci
 
: ð3Þ
This last relation can be thought of as representing what has come to be called experienced utility, to distinguish it
from the decision-based concept of utility proposed by Samuelson (1937).
This is, in essence, Sen's (1985, pp. 11–14) original model, with only minor notational differences. What people are
free to do, as distinct from what they actually do, is important for assessing a person's overall advantage. This distinc-
tion is reflected in standard measures of health that include both actual experience of pain as well as the ability to get
around (e.g. EuroQol 1990). In many situations, activities or states can be ends in themselves, whereas happiness could
be a driver or by-product of some desirable state or activity. Happiness, however, is adaptive, and people can adapt to
both goods and bads, so Sen (1985, pp. 11–14) emphasises that it cannot be relied on as a gold standard measure of
value. This important observation has led some to interpret Sen's capability approach as not being concerned about
human happiness Bruni, Comim, and Pugno (2008). That is not the case, however, so we focus on this aspect of quality
of life.
Although all three aspects of wellbeing (capabilities, activities and happiness) are important to understand a per-
son's overall quality of life, our data on capabilities are the most novel. In Figure 1, we illustrate how capability sets can
be visualised. In this particular example, a star graph indicates that person B has more capabilities in all but one
domain but does not dominate A who has better access to services.
In the empirical work here as elsewhere (see for instance Anand, Krishnakumar, & Tran, 2011), we develop data
that measure the vertices of each set. Rather than trying to estimate the elements of the set, which is feasible only for
very small sets, our approach relies on the fact that the set of all possible activity and state vectors defines another set of
3For the rest of this paper, we focus on activities and use the term ‘functioning’ synonymously.
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maximal points on each dimension. Using the fact that the set Qi defines a set of maximum points in the n-dimensional
space indexed by j, we can define an estimator of the ith individual's capability set thus
Q^i = d
*
i,1,d
*
i,2,   ,d*i,n
 
, ð4Þ
where d*i,j are the capability assessments for each of the j dimensions. This estimator reflects what a person is able to do
on a dimension by dimension basis.4
To assess the impact of disability on capabilities and activities, we first denote disability by Di ∈ R+, where higher
values denote increasing disability. We assume that in general
∂d*i,j
∂Di
≤ 0; that is, d*i,j is weakly decreasing in Di for all i,j. In
other words, a disability is not capability enhancing in any of the n dimensions. However, disability could be expected
to reduce some capabilities more than others. Thus, if an unimpaired individual with a capability set
Qi = d
*
i,1,d
*
i,2,…,d
*
i,n
 
were subsequently to become impaired, the resulting capability set Q0i = d0*i,1,d
0*
i,2,…,d
0*
i,n
 
would
have the following two features:
i
Pn
j=1d
0*
i,j ≤
Pn
j=1d
*
i,j
ii In general, d0*i,j=d
0*
i,k 6¼ d*i,j=d*i,k.
We could expect a similar impact of disability on the set of activities: (i) a reduction in total activities but also (ii) a
change in the relative frequency of activities. These effects might be considered loosely analogous to the income and sub-
stitution effects in the standard neoclassical constrained optimisation problem. In the standard neoclassical problem,
these effects arise from the reduction in the budget set and the change in relative prices, arising from one good's price
increase. Here, the effects arise from the overall reduction that a disability causes in an individual's opportunity to
engage in activities, together with the fact that this reduction is not uniform across different types of activity, making
certain activities relatively more ‘costly.’
Opportunity effect of impairment :
Xn
j=1
f 0i,j ≤
Xn
j=1
f i,j ð5Þ
Substitution effect of impairment :
f 0i,jPn
l=1f
0
i,l
= αj
f i,jPn
l=1f i,l
for someαj∈R+ : ð6Þ
FIGURE 1 Capability sets for two
individuals [Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
4Geometrically it amounts to proxying the individual's capability set with a multidimensional polyhedron in line with theory discussed by Klemisch-
Ahlert (1993).
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The overall levels of opportunity, or resource, for engaging in activities are lower for disabled people so they ‘pur-
chase’ fewer activities in Equation 5. However, relative prices are also different, resulting in a substitution in Equation 6
away from activities that have been particularly affected (e.g. more physically demanding activities such as walks in the
park) to those which may now be only marginally more difficult (e.g. reading a book).
In Equation 6, if αj > 1,this indicates a substitution towards activity j from the n − 1 other activities (and conversely
if αj < 1). In theory, it is quite possible for this effect to be large enough to outweigh the ‘opportunity’ effect in Equa-
tion 5 so that the net effect of disability is an increase in frequency of activity j. To see this, note that Equation 5 can be
rewritten as:
Xn
l=1
f 0i,l + β=
Xn
l=1
f i,l for some β≥0, ð7Þ
where β indicates the absolute size of the opportunity effect of impairment.
Substituting Equation 7 into Equation 6, we have
f 0i,jPn
l=1
f 0i,l
=
αj f i,j
β+
Pn
l=1
f 0i,l
. Rearranging, we have
f 0i,j
f i,j
=
αj
Pn
l=1
f 0i,l
β+
Pn
l=1
f 0i,l
. Therefore,
f 0i,j > f i,j⟺αj
Pn
l= 1
f0i,l > β+
Pn
l= 1
f0i,l, which simplifies to the condition that
f 0i,j > f i,j⟺αj > 1+
βPn
l= 1f
0
i,l
: ð8Þ
The intuition from the condition in Equation 8 is clear. The net effect of disability on frequency of activity j depends
on the size of the substitution effect αj relative to the size of the opportunity cost of impairment as a proportion of total
activities. For the substitution effect to lead to increased frequency of activity j, it is always the case that αj > 1. As the
opportunity cost of impairment tends towards zero, there need only be an infinitesimally small substitution effect
towards j in order for activity j to increase due to impairment.
Almost all applications to date of Sen's theory assume that capabilities are positively related to an individual's
resources and ability to convert resources into valued activities. Our framework is also, however, able to allow for nega-
tive relations when ‘substitution’ effects are sufficiently high compared with opportunity effects. If any activities behave
like inferior goods, then a framework that does not rule out positive relations between disability and activities, counter-
intuitive though this may seem, is required.5
2.2 | Data and empirical implementation
The data developed for our analysis were produced through a population level survey in the UK designed to deliver a
profile of overall quality of life at national level. To ensure that our sample population was as close as possible to being
nationally representative, the panel of respondents was drawn equally from England, Scotland and Wales and is repre-
sentative of working age adults in terms of age, gender and social class. The survey was conducted by YouGov in 2012
and supplemented in 2013 with an additional sample of people, all of whom had a doctor diagnosed mobility problem
or were registered disabled (due to mobility impairment)6.7 These individuals were asked exactly the same questions as
the original representative 2012 sample. In total this provides us with 2013 data for a sample of 633 mobility impaired
individuals and 1,172 nonimpaired individuals.
5It should be stressed that the purpose is not to suggest that capabilities or activities often decrease with better health but rather to allow,
theoretically, for the possibility that this can happen. Most goods are consumed more when income rises, but some, like supermarket own brands,
though valued are consumed less as income rises—our point is that some activities are similar in regards to their ‘income’ elasticities.
6The precise question respondents answered was ‘Have you been diagnosed by a doctor, or are you registered as disabled [in the following way]: A
condition that substantially limits one or more basic physical activities such as walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting or carrying.’ Ethics approval
for the collaboration with YouGov was granted by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) Open University.
7Background analysis and early use of related data in health economics can be found, for example in Chirikos and Nestel (1984).
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Data were collected on capabilities, activity involvement and psychological cost, as well as a range of socio-
economic variables8 (see Anand, Roope, and Peichl (2016) for further details for the derivations of these questions). The
most distinctive component of our dataset relates to the measurement of capabilities; these are reproduced in the online
supplementary materials9 and relate to the opportunities and constraints individuals face across five domains—Home
(i.e. domestic and family life), Work, Community, the Environment in which one lives and Access to Services. In each
of these domains, several ‘subdomain’ questions were asked, regarding various specific things that people are able to do
or to achieve. In total, data were collected for 29 capabilities across these domains. Only respondents who reported
being employed or self-employed at the time were asked the Work domain questions.
Consider a set of individuals i = 1,2,  ,N. As discussed above, we distinguish between their capabilities, di, things
that they can do; their activities or functionings, fi, the things that they actually do; and their well-being, ui, their satis-
faction with life. These are all influenced by their mobility impairment, if any, Di; their income Yi; and a vector of
resources and personal characteristics, ci, such as gender, age, race, education, whether working, living with a partner
or with dependent children.
From the survey we have data on 29 capability indicators, dji (such as able to get to places easily); 30 activity indica-
tors f ki , (such as doing exercise); and 8 wellbeing measures, u
l
i (such as satisfaction with life or with colleagues). Mobil-
ity impairment was either diagnosed by a doctor or the person was registered disabled. Sample size differed between
general responses and responses specific to the subsample who worked.
Three sets of equations were estimated. For capabilities j = 1,2,  ,29
dji = β
j
0 + β
j
1Di + β
j
2Yi + γ
jci + ε
j
i
For activities k = 1,  ,30
f ki = β
k
0 + β
k
1Di+ β
k
2Yi + γ
kci + ε
k
i
For well-being indicators l = 1,2,  ,8
uli = β
l
0 + β
l
1Di + β
l
2Yi + γ
lci+ εli:
These are cross-section equations, and, since at least Friedman (1957), it has been common to interpret the
between-unit association as representing the long-run permanent relationship rather than the transitory, within-unit,
adjustment process. Thus, although there are likely to be person-specific features, such as how long the respondent's
mobility has been impaired, the cross-section variation is likely to dominate, as discussed by Pesaran and Smith (1995).
We report two analyses. First, we know from previous capability research using secondary data that the costs of dis-
ability can be high, though we do not know why. By developing and comparing capability indicators for people with a
mobility impairment and those without, we can in principle distinguish between two plausible patterns associated with
mobility impairment: one in which capability losses are concentrated and a second in which they are widespread. Both
are plausible though appropriate policy responses will differ.
Second, we use the subjective wellbeing regressions to derive a monetary estimate of the impact of mobility impair-
ment on life-satisfaction. We use the compensating variation approach, where the value of mobility impairment is esti-
mated as
CV =exp −
βmi
βy
+ lny
 !
−y, ð10Þ
8For a discussion of socio-economic variables correlated with health, see for example Fuchs (2004).
9All the capability questions are detailed in supplementary Appendix A. Derivation is further discussed across several papers but see for example
Anand et al (2009, 2016), and Simon et al (2013).
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where βmi and βy denote the coefficients on mobility impairment and (log) income, respectively, in an OLS model of life
satisfaction, and y denotes mean income. This or similar methods have been used to assign market values to a wide
variety of nonmarket goods.10
As an alternative way of quantifying the impact of mobility impairment in monetary terms, we use the association
between mobility impairment and self-reported EQ-5D-3L health utility to estimate the value of quality of life lost as a
result of mobility impairment, annually and discounted over remaining life expectancy, using the ceiling willingness to
pay of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) of between £20,000 and £30,000 per Quality-
Adjusted Life-Year (QALY) gained. EQ-5D-3L health utility was elicited in our survey instrument using standard ques-
tions developed by EuroQol (1990).11 By definition, an individual's EQ-5D-3L health utility is equal to the proportion by
which their life years are discounted to obtain their estimated QALYs. Thus, the mobility impairment coefficient in an
OLS model of EQ-5D-3L health utility was used to provide an estimate of annual QALYs lost due to impairment. QALYs
lost until death were estimated by multiplying this figure by remaining life expectancy. Our estimate of life expectancy
was estimated simply by subtracting the mean age of the full sample (45.654) from the general population average life
expectancy of 81.5 years and did not adjust for possible reduced life expectancy arising from mobility impairment.
3 | RESULTS
A descriptive summary of capability scores from our survey is reported in Table 1, showing that people with a mobility
impairment are systematically worse off than those without a mobility impairment: pairwise t-tests suggest strongly sta-
tistically significant differences in all but two areas. Two out of the top three (in significance terms) are clearly related
to spatial mobility (getting to places easily and access to parks), but it is interesting and perhaps less obvious that work–
life is also highly related to the disability. Generally speaking, access to services are least significant and, in the case of
getting help from doctors, nurses or the police, the differences are not statistically significant.
Turning to measures of functioning as measured by ‘involvement yesterday in 28 different activities’, Table 2
shows significant differences between impaired and nonimpaired respondents in 14 of the 28 areas and that these
effects operate in both directions (as allowed in our theory). Thus, active involvement in commuting, cooking, drink-
ing alcohol, exercise, housework, internet use for work, intimate relations, listening to music, paid employment and
playing a musical instrument are reported significantly less often by those with mobility impairment compared with
others. This does not rule out some substitution effect towards some of these activities, for example from those
related to work to those done in the home, but does suggest that in these instances the direct effect of impaired
mobility is dominant. By contrast, relaxing, self-care and smoking are reported more frequently by those with a
mobility impairment, a pattern compatible with a substitution effect, which has considerable face validity as a possi-
ble explanation.
The third set of measures concern psychological wellbeing. Our initial results for the eight measures are reported in
Table 3. Across all eight measures, people with mobility impairment report significantly lower wellbeing than non-
impaired respondents. In five cases, the difference is highly significant (<1%), whereas satisfaction with friendships is
lower on average, but only at the 10% level of significance. Note that ‘anxiety yesterday’ is the only indicator in which
higher scores indicate lower welfare, and is significantly higher on average for those with mobility impairment.
Table 4 reports ordered probit results for each of the 29 capability measures. Income and mobility impairment are
the most consistent predictors of capabilities across all the areas covered by our indicators. That said, for some services,
including healthcare, mobility impairment is not a significant predictor. Being white also stands out as a predictor of
access to a range of services, whereas having a partner and dependent children are often statistically significant predic-
tors of capabilities related to the environment.12 13
10These nonmarket goods (and bads) include the cost of domestic violence (Santos, 2013), air quality (Luechinger, 2009) and (Levinson, 2012), flood
disasters (Luechinger & Raschky, 2009), terrorism (Frey, Luechinger, & Stutzer, 2007), noise (van Praag & Baarsma, 2005) and informal care (Van den
Berg & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2007).
11For an overview of such methods see for instance Dolan, Gudex, Kind, and Williams (1996).
12Raw gradients are graphed in online materials (Figure B1).
13By way of extension, we also estimated a finite mixture model based on capabilities aggregated into subscales representing the five areas discussed.
Exploratory results suggest that whilst mobility impairment is generally predictive of capability, there is evidence of two groups in the data
differentiated by size of the mobility impact.
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TABLE 1 Capability scores: Mobility impairment versus no mobility impairment
Capabilities
Impaired Nonimpaired
n Mean SE n Mean SE t-test for Difference
Home life
Make ends meet 633 5.701 0.12 1,172 7.323 0.079 11.29***
Find suitable home 633 6.553 0.124 1,172 7.713 0.079 7.88***
Enjoy personal relations 633 5.953 0.129 1,172 7.125 0.084 7.597***
Feel loved and valued 633 6.194 0.126 1,172 7.27 0.08 7.18***
Share tasks fairly 633 5.232 0.126 1,172 7.009 0.089 11.49***
Socialise with family members 633 6.229 0.123 1,172 7.308 0.079 7.358***
Work life
Work–life balance 633 4.564 0.128 1,172 6.869 0.081 15.24***
Find work when need 205 6.21 0.218 889 7.562 0.092 5.7***
Can use skills 205 6.58 0.21 889 7.534 0.088 4.19***
Promotion opportunities 205 4.795 0.216 889 5.756 0.1 4.029***
Have good boss 205 6.054 0.229 889 7.018 0.097 3.885***
Treated as equal at work 205 6.517 0.224 889 7.828 0.087 5.446***
Socialise with colleagues 205 5.351 0.211 889 6.451 0.091 4.78***
Community life
Participate social events 633 4.774 0.114 1,172 5.967 0.077 8.65***
Treated as equal 633 7.387 0.121 1,172 8.088 0.072 4.99***
Religious freedom 633 7.981 0.115 1,172 8.534 0.071 4.086***
Political freedom 633 7.733 0.113 1,172 8.091 0.073 2.657***
Local Environment
Safe at night 633 6.664 0.122 1,172 7.893 0.072 8.65***
Access to parks 633 6.408 0.135 1,172 8.419 0.076 12.97***
Low pollution 633 5.348 0.127 1,172 6.98 0.084 10.74***
Can keep a pet 633 7.581 0.133 1,172 8.256 0.09 4.19***
Can get to places easily 633 4.795 0.125 1,172 7.994 0.077 21.84***
Access to Services
Use financial services 633 7.942 0.109 1,172 8.658 0.065 5.645***
Get rubbish cleared 633 7.689 0.113 1,172 8.544 0.065 6.56***
Get house problems fixed 633 7.376 0.116 1,172 7.767 0.072 2.86***
Get doctor or nurse 633 8.299 0.1 1,172 8.264 0.067 −0.29
Help from police 633 7.662 0.107 1,172 7.83 0.069 1.32
Legal help 633 7.254 0.117 1,172 7.772 0.071 3.78***
Range of shops 633 6.886 0.124 1,172 8.498 0.068 11.38***
Total Capabilities 205 17.239 0.284 889 20.594 0.232
Note. (1.) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; (2.) means are of quasi-Likert eleven point scales.
TABLE 2 Activity involvement: Impaired versus nonimpaired
Impaired Nonimpaired
n Mean SE n Mean SE p-value
Attending class 408 0.015 0.006 770 0.017 0.005 0.7778
Caring (unpaid) 408 0.083 0.014 770 0.068 0.009 0.3212
Commuting 408 0.123 0.016 770 0.305 0.017 <0.0001***
Cooking 408 0.370 0.024 770 0.461 0.018 0.0027***
DIY 408 0.056 0.011 770 0.079 0.010 0.1471
Drinking alcohol 408 0.145 0.017 770 0.209 0.015 0.0069***
Exercise 408 0.108 0.015 770 0.251 0.016 <0.0001***
Housework 408 0.377 0.024 770 0.461 0.018 0.0059***
Internet (personal) 408 0.787 0.020 770 0.764 0.015 0.3682
Internet (work) 408 0.105 0.015 770 0.231 0.015 <0.0001***
Intimate relations 408 0.069 0.013 770 0.105 0.011 0.0393**
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Our results in Table 5 repeat the ordered probit analysis for measures of psychological wellbeing. Again, mobility
impairment and income are the most consistent predictors across almost all measures, followed by having a partner.
The one exception is satisfaction with friendships where there is no statistically significant difference between those
with a mobility impairment and others. Controlling for other variables, we find little evidence of any association
between ethnicity and subjective wellbeing.
An OLS regression was also performed to estimate the coefficient on mobility impairment, including the same set of
variables as the ordered probit and with EQ-5D-3L utility as the dependent variable. These showed that mobility
impairment is associated with an annual reduction of 0.428 QALYs. The results reported so far suggest that, contrary to
concerns about adaptation (Oswald & Powdthavee, 2008a), those with a mobility impairment have a sustained experi-
ence and report continuing impaired capabilities and continuing lower wellbeing. Table 6 reports the results of mone-
tizing these wellbeing losses, using the two approaches described in the methods section. Using the compensating
variation method, we estimate that the impact of mobility impairment on life satisfaction ranges from £42,749 to
£78,877 using a linear and log functional form, respectively. In our alternative valuation method, at NICE's £20,000 ceil-
ing willingness to pay, the annual reduction in QALYs from impairment of 0.428 corresponds to a value of £8,552 over
TABLE 3 Psychological wellbeing measures: Impaired versus nonimpaired
Impaired Nonimpaired
n Mean SE n Mean SE t-test
Life satisfaction 633 5.510 0.098 1,172 6.850 0.068 11.21***
Happy yesterday 633 5.641 0.101 1,172 6.718 0.071 8.74***
Anxious yesterday 633 5.548 0.112 1,172 5.234 0.076 −2.326**
Life worthwhile 633 5.905 0.113 1,172 6.933 0.070 7.768***
Satisfied with friendships 633 7.039 0.113 1,172 7.296 0.072 1.918*
Satisfied with colleagues 633 4.852 0.122 1,172 6.871 0.073 14.229***
Satisfied with neighbourhood 633 6.502 0.107 1,172 7.124 0.065 4.968***
Yesterday pleasurable 633 5.276 0.096 1,172 6.163 0.063 7.709***
Notes. (1.) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; (2.) means are of quasi-Likert 11-point scales.
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Impaired Nonimpaired
n Mean SE n Mean SE p-value
Listening to music 408 0.355 0.024 770 0.442 0.018 0.0042***
Looking after pet 408 0.377 0.024 770 0.343 0.017 0.2377
Other outdoor 408 0.054 0.011 770 0.069 0.009 0.3187
Paid employment 408 0.228 0.021 770 0.542 0.018 <0.0001***
Playing musical instrument 408 0.022 0.007 770 0.055 0.008 0.0091***
Praying or meditating 408 0.088 0.014 770 0.066 0.009 0.1695
Relaxing or napping 408 0.404 0.024 770 0.268 0.016 <0.0001***
Reading 408 0.419 0.024 770 0.423 0.018 0.8880
Self-care 408 0.370 0.024 770 0.242 0.015 <0.0001***
Smoking 408 0.199 0.020 770 0.119 0.012 0.0003***
Socialising 408 0.118 0.016 770 0.169 0.014 0.0196**
Shopping 408 0.272 0.022 770 0.316 0.017 0.1211
Time with children 408 0.194 0.020 770 0.235 0.015 0.1027
Visiting park or countryside 408 0.088 0.014 770 0.105 0.011 0.3544
Visiting cinema/concert/gallery/museum 408 0.056 0.011 770 0.066 0.009 0.5069
Volunteering 408 0.059 0.012 770 0.061 0.009 0.8792
Watching TV 408 0.757 0.021 770 0.731 0.016 0.3295
Note. (i) Smaller sample sizes than in Table 1 because these data relate only to ‘those for whom yesterday was a normal working day’; (ii) .
p-values are from chi-squared tests under null hypothesis of equal means for impaired and nonimpaired; means are of binary activity
involvement reports; data relate to those for whom yesterday was a normal working day.
ANAND ET AL. 9
T
A
B
L
E
4
M
ob
ili
ty
im
pa
ir
m
en
t
im
pa
ct
s
on
ca
pa
bi
lit
ie
s:
O
rd
er
ed
pr
ob
it
re
su
lt
s.
or
de
re
d
pr
ob
it
m
od
el
s
of
m
ob
ili
ty
im
pa
ir
m
en
t
im
pa
ct
s
on
ca
pa
bi
lit
ie
s
V
ar
ia
bl
es
(1
)
M
ak
e
en
d
s
m
ee
t
(2
)
F
in
d
su
it
ab
le
h
om
e
(3
)
H
om
e–
re
la
ti
on
s
(4
)
H
om
e–
lo
ve
d
(5
)
H
om
e–
sh
ar
e
(6
)
H
om
e–
so
ci
al
(7
)
W
or
k
–
li
fe
ba
la
n
ce
(8
)
C
an
fi
n
d
w
or
k
(9
)
W
or
k
–
ca
n
u
se
sk
il
ls
(1
0)
W
or
k
–
op
p
or
tu
n
it
ie
s
M
ob
ili
ty
im
pa
ir
ed
−
0.
40
1*
**
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
36
5*
**
(0
.0
57
)
−
0.
32
7*
**
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
28
3*
**
(0
.0
59
)
−
0.
44
6*
**
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
29
3*
**
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
66
2*
**
(0
.0
60
)
−
0.
34
2*
**
(0
.0
87
)
−
0.
25
3*
**
(0
.0
87
)
−
0.
22
0*
*
(0
.0
88
)
A
ge
−
0.
09
7*
**
(0
.0
21
)
−
0.
01
5
(0
.0
21
)
−
0.
05
0*
*
(0
.0
21
)
−
0.
05
4*
**
(0
.0
21
)
−
0.
04
4*
*
(0
.0
21
)
−
0.
05
5*
**
(0
.0
21
)
−
0.
08
4*
**
(0
.0
21
)
−
0.
02
8
(0
.0
28
)
0.
01
7
(0
.0
27
)
−
0.
02
1
(0
.0
28
)
A
ge
Sq
ua
re
d/
10
00
1.
11
2*
**
(0
.2
47
)
0.
31
0
(0
.2
44
)
0.
65
9*
**
(0
.2
45
)
0.
66
4*
**
(0
.2
43
)
0.
43
1*
(0
.2
45
)
0.
66
8*
**
(0
.2
44
)
0.
95
9*
**
(0
.2
44
)
0.
27
2
(0
.3
20
)
−
0.
19
7
(0
.3
18
)
0.
14
5
(0
.3
31
)
L
og
ge
d
H
H
E
qu
iv
.
In
co
m
e
0.
48
1*
**
(0
.0
39
)
0.
26
0*
**
(0
.0
38
)
0.
20
5*
**
(0
.0
37
)
0.
19
9*
**
(0
.0
39
)
0.
16
8*
**
(0
.0
37
)
0.
17
4*
**
(0
.0
37
)
0.
29
5*
**
(0
.0
37
)
0.
48
0*
**
(0
.0
53
)
0.
36
9*
**
(0
.0
55
)
0.
24
9*
**
(0
.0
52
)
M
al
e
0.
02
8
(0
.0
49
)
−
0.
08
4*
(0
.0
50
)
−
0.
05
9
(0
.0
50
)
−
0.
13
0*
**
(0
.0
49
)
0.
24
5*
**
(0
.0
50
)
0.
09
4*
(0
.0
50
)
0.
07
4
(0
.0
50
)
0.
10
7*
(0
.0
64
)
−
0.
06
1
(0
.0
64
)
−
0.
06
6
(0
.0
64
)
H
ig
h
er
E
du
c.
0.
19
4*
**
(0
.0
53
)
0.
14
8*
**
(0
.0
52
)
0.
10
6*
*
(0
.0
54
)
0.
13
8*
*
(0
.0
54
)
0.
07
1
(0
.0
54
)
0.
03
8
(0
.0
53
)
0.
12
2*
*
(0
.0
54
)
0.
06
5
(0
.0
68
)
0.
06
5
(0
.0
68
)
0.
08
4
(0
.0
67
)
W
h
it
e
−
0.
02
9
(0
.1
05
)
0.
15
5
(0
.1
17
)
−
0.
05
2
(0
.1
19
)
0.
04
2
(0
.1
26
)
−
0.
12
6
(0
.1
19
)
0.
11
2
(0
.1
15
)
−
0.
08
0
(0
.1
11
)
0.
31
3*
*
(0
.1
50
)
0.
17
9
(0
.1
56
)
0.
09
4
(0
.1
51
)
U
n
em
pl
oy
ed
−
0.
44
2*
**
(0
.1
10
)
−
0.
22
1*
*
(0
.1
00
)
−
0.
06
8
(0
.1
10
)
−
0.
16
5
(0
.1
10
)
−
0.
00
7
(0
.0
95
)
−
0.
08
8
(0
.1
00
)
−
0.
34
7*
**
(0
.1
05
)
M
ar
ri
ed
/l
iv
e
w
it
h
pa
rt
n
er
0.
27
6*
**
(0
.0
56
)
0.
30
4*
**
(0
.0
56
)
0.
75
9*
**
(0
.0
56
)
0.
57
6*
**
(0
.0
56
)
0.
54
5*
**
(0
.0
59
)
0.
36
5*
**
(0
.0
57
)
0.
18
2*
**
(0
.0
56
)
0.
10
9
(0
.0
73
)
0.
11
4
(0
.0
72
)
0.
03
4
(0
.0
72
)
H
av
e
de
p.
C
h
ild
re
n
−
0.
03
5
(0
.0
59
)
−
0.
00
5
(0
.0
59
)
−
0.
08
5
(0
.0
61
)
−
0.
01
2
(0
.0
60
)
−
0.
08
7
(0
.0
57
)
0.
04
9
(0
.0
59
)
0.
04
7
(0
.0
58
)
0.
10
0
(0
.0
75
)
0.
01
6
(0
.0
77
)
0.
04
6
(0
.0
77
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
05
8
1,
05
8
1,
05
8
Ps
eu
do
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
.0
56
1
.0
30
0
.0
43
1
.0
32
5
.0
35
7
.0
20
0
.0
44
9
.0
32
1
.0
18
7
.0
11
7
A
IC
77
11
.7
07
77
21
.4
47
77
88
.8
47
78
18
.0
01
77
48
.9
91
79
00
.4
8
77
26
.8
41
46
52
.5
55
47
31
.4
27
49
22
.8
82
B
IC
78
20
.9
4
78
30
.6
8
78
98
.0
8
79
27
.2
34
78
58
.2
24
80
09
.7
13
78
36
.0
74
47
46
.8
74
48
25
.7
45
50
17
.2
N
ot
e.
(1
.)
* ,
**
an
d
**
*
in
di
ca
te
st
at
is
ti
ca
ls
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
at
th
e
10
%
,5
%
an
d
1%
le
ve
ls
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
;(
2.
)
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
.
10 ANAND ET AL.
T
A
B
L
E
4
M
ob
ili
ty
im
pa
ir
m
en
t
im
pa
ct
s
on
ca
pa
bi
li
ti
es
:O
rd
er
ed
pr
ob
it
re
su
lt
s.
or
de
re
d
pr
ob
it
m
od
el
s
of
m
ob
ili
ty
im
pa
ir
m
en
t
im
pa
ct
s
on
ca
pa
bi
lit
ie
s
V
ar
ia
bl
es
(1
1)
W
or
k
–
go
od
m
an
ag
er
(1
2)
W
or
k
–
eq
u
al
(1
3)
W
or
k
–
so
ci
al
(1
4)
C
om
m
u
n
it
y–
so
ci
al
(1
5)
C
om
m
u
n
it
y–
tr
ea
te
d
as
eq
u
al
(1
6)
C
om
m
u
n
it
y–
re
li
gi
on
(1
7)
C
om
m
u
n
it
y–
p
ol
it
ic
al
(1
8)
E
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t–
sa
fe
(1
9)
E
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t–
p
ar
k
s
(2
0)
E
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t–
lo
w
p
ol
lu
ti
on
M
ob
ili
ty
im
pa
ir
ed
−
0.
22
6*
*
(0
.0
90
)
−
0.
40
5*
**
(0
.0
90
)
−
0.
28
7*
**
(0
.0
90
)
−
0.
35
4*
**
(0
.0
59
)
−
0.
24
4*
**
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
21
8*
**
(0
.0
57
)
−
0.
11
7*
*
(0
.0
57
)
−
0.
34
7*
**
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
61
4*
**
(0
.0
59
)
−
0.
46
2*
**
(0
.0
59
)
A
ge
−
0.
04
0
(0
.0
28
)
−
0.
03
2
(0
.0
28
)
−
0.
04
0
(0
.0
28
)
−
0.
06
1*
**
(0
.0
21
)
−
0.
07
0*
**
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
03
5
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
04
5*
*
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
00
2
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
03
6*
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
01
0
(0
.0
21
)
A
ge
Sq
ua
re
d/
10
00
0.
39
1
(0
.3
29
)
0.
38
3
(0
.3
22
)
0.
36
8
(0
.3
25
)
0.
74
8*
**
(0
.2
47
)
0.
00
1*
**
(0
.0
00
)
0.
49
4*
(0
.2
58
)
0.
60
8*
*
(0
.2
49
)
0.
06
4
(0
.2
53
)
0.
46
8*
(0
.2
50
)
0.
12
8
(0
.2
46
)
L
og
ge
d
H
H
E
qu
iv
.
In
co
m
e
0.
22
0*
**
(0
.0
52
)
0.
20
0*
**
(0
.0
52
)
0.
29
9*
**
(0
.0
53
)
0.
21
2*
**
(0
.0
38
)
0.
13
9*
**
(0
.0
38
)
0.
11
8*
**
(0
.0
37
)
0.
15
4*
**
(0
.0
37
)
0.
16
0*
**
(0
.0
38
)
0.
24
4*
**
(0
.0
38
)
0.
19
6*
**
(0
.0
37
)
M
al
e
−
0.
07
6
(0
.0
64
)
0.
03
5
(0
.0
64
)
0.
01
9
(0
.0
63
)
−
0.
06
3
(0
.0
49
)
−
0.
17
4*
**
(0
.0
50
)
−
0.
04
3
(0
.0
51
)
−
0.
03
4
(0
.0
50
)
0.
15
9*
**
(0
.0
50
)
0.
05
9
(0
.0
50
)
0.
02
3
(0
.0
50
)
H
ig
h
er
E
du
c.
0.
00
7
(0
.0
68
)
0.
03
5
(0
.0
67
)
0.
01
2
(0
.0
68
)
0.
21
8*
**
(0
.0
53
)
0.
07
1
(0
.0
53
)
0.
24
5*
**
(0
.0
53
)
0.
22
0*
**
(0
.0
53
)
0.
15
1*
**
(0
.0
53
)
0.
09
0*
(0
.0
54
)
0.
12
0*
*
(0
.0
54
)
W
h
it
e
0.
23
9*
(0
.1
41
)
0.
11
7
(0
.1
38
)
0.
01
5
(0
.1
31
)
−
0.
01
4
(0
.1
10
)
0.
47
8*
**
(0
.1
10
)
0.
40
6*
**
(0
.1
08
)
0.
35
7*
**
(0
.1
16
)
0.
26
0*
*
(0
.1
20
)
0.
22
1*
(0
.1
17
)
0.
04
8
(0
.1
06
)
U
n
em
pl
oy
ed
−
0.
02
2
(0
.1
06
)
−
0.
05
4
(0
.1
05
)
−
0.
05
8
(0
.1
10
)
0.
03
2
(0
.1
07
)
0.
00
7
(0
.0
98
)
−
0.
11
0
(0
.1
08
)
−
0.
24
2*
*
(0
.0
98
)
M
ar
ri
ed
/l
iv
e
w
it
h
pa
rt
n
er
0.
12
8*
(0
.0
73
)
0.
05
5
(0
.0
74
)
0.
10
7
(0
.0
71
)
0.
23
8*
**
(0
.0
55
)
0.
11
5*
*
(0
.0
55
)
0.
02
0
(0
.0
57
)
0.
04
0
(0
.0
56
)
0.
05
0
(0
.0
56
)
0.
10
2*
(0
.0
57
)
0.
10
2*
(0
.0
56
)
H
av
e
de
p.
C
h
ild
re
n
−
0.
01
7
(0
.0
77
)
−
0.
00
6
(0
.0
76
)
0.
02
2
(0
.0
74
)
0.
11
6*
(0
.0
59
)
0.
13
7*
*
(0
.0
60
)
−
0.
00
1
(0
.0
60
)
0.
01
5
(0
.0
59
)
0.
07
8
(0
.0
59
)
0.
20
4*
**
(0
.0
60
)
0.
12
5*
*
(0
.0
60
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
1,
05
8
1,
05
8
1,
05
8
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
Ps
eu
do
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
.0
09
7
.0
11
0
.0
14
8
.0
23
7
.0
15
6
.0
12
9
.0
11
3
.0
16
3
.0
34
6
.0
23
0
A
IC
48
57
.9
95
47
00
.6
83
48
76
.2
92
78
39
.3
35
74
36
.0
77
68
19
.6
67
72
72
.0
27
76
81
.8
36
74
34
.2
94
78
94
.5
37
B
IC
49
52
.3
13
47
95
.0
02
49
70
.6
1
79
48
.5
68
75
45
.3
09
69
28
.9
73
81
.2
6
77
91
.0
69
75
43
.5
27
80
03
.7
7
ANAND ET AL. 11
T
A
B
L
E
4
M
ob
ili
ty
im
pa
ir
m
en
t
im
pa
ct
s
on
ca
pa
bi
li
ti
es
:O
rd
er
ed
pr
ob
it
re
su
lt
s.
or
de
re
d
pr
ob
it
m
od
el
s
of
m
ob
ili
ty
im
pa
ir
m
en
t
im
pa
ct
s
on
ca
pa
bi
lit
ie
s
V
ar
ia
bl
es
(2
1)
E
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t–
p
et
s
(2
2)
E
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t–
tr
av
el
/a
cc
es
s
(2
3)
Se
rv
ic
es
–
ba
n
k
(2
4)
Se
rv
ic
es
–
ru
bb
is
h
(2
5)
Se
rv
ic
es
–
fi
x
p
ro
bl
em
s
(2
6)
Se
rv
ic
es
–
d
oc
to
r
(2
7)
Se
rv
ic
es
–
p
ol
ic
e
(2
8)
Se
rv
ic
es
–
so
li
ci
to
r
(2
9)
Se
rv
ic
es
–
sh
op
s
M
ob
ili
ty
im
pa
ir
ed
−
0.
25
5*
**
(0
.0
58
)
−
1.
02
1*
**
(0
.0
62
)
−
0.
23
8*
**
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
32
9*
**
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
07
6
(0
.0
57
)
0.
03
4
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
02
5
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
12
6*
*
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
53
6*
**
(0
.0
58
)
A
ge
0.
00
9
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
06
8*
**
0.
02
2
−
0.
01
5
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
03
2
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
01
9
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
03
9*
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
03
0
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
03
1
(0
.0
21
)
−
0.
02
3
(0
.0
22
)
A
ge
Sq
ua
re
d/
10
00
0.
03
4
(0
.2
58
)
0.
80
9*
**
0.
25
0
0.
25
3
(0
.2
50
)
0.
49
4*
(0
.2
53
)
0.
26
4
(0
.2
50
)
0.
52
0*
*
(0
.2
55
)
0.
38
0
(0
.2
52
)
0.
47
9*
(0
.2
46
)
0.
33
3
(0
.2
49
)
L
og
ge
d
H
H
E
qu
iv
.
In
co
m
e
0.
14
0*
**
(0
.0
39
)
0.
33
9*
**
(0
.0
39
)
0.
23
4*
**
(0
.0
39
)
0.
13
7*
**
(0
.0
38
)
0.
17
7*
**
(0
.0
37
)
0.
09
2*
*
(0
.0
37
)
0.
12
3*
**
(0
.0
38
)
0.
25
1*
**
(0
.0
38
)
0.
21
6*
**
(0
.0
38
)
M
al
e
−
0.
15
8*
**
(0
.0
52
)
0.
06
3
(0
.0
50
)
−
0.
01
4
(0
.0
51
)
−
0.
11
4*
*
(0
.0
51
)
−
0.
00
8
(0
.0
50
)
−
0.
06
9
(0
.0
50
)
−
0.
16
9*
**
(0
.0
50
)
−
0.
08
2*
(0
.0
50
)
−
0.
05
7
(0
.0
50
)
H
ig
h
er
E
du
c.
−
0.
11
4*
*
(0
.0
55
)
0.
02
1
(0
.0
54
)
0.
02
8
(0
.0
54
)
0.
02
3
(0
.0
54
)
−
0.
05
0
(0
.0
54
)
−
0.
02
1
(0
.0
54
)
0.
04
3
(0
.0
53
)
0.
07
6
(0
.0
53
)
0.
11
0*
*
(0
.0
53
)
W
h
it
e
0.
47
4*
**
(0
.1
01
)
0.
15
2
(0
.1
07
)
0.
18
5
(0
.1
19
)
0.
31
2*
**
(0
.1
15
)
0.
23
5*
*
(0
.1
10
)
0.
38
8*
**
(0
.1
15
)
0.
35
9*
**
(0
.1
12
)
0.
39
6*
**
(0
.1
11
)
0.
32
1*
**
(0
.1
20
)
U
n
em
pl
oy
ed
−
0.
24
2*
*
(0
.1
05
)
−
0.
22
2*
*
(0
.1
01
)
−
0.
22
0*
*
(0
.1
04
)
−
0.
06
4
(0
.1
03
)
−
0.
12
8
(0
.1
01
)
−
0.
10
6
(0
.0
96
)
−
0.
03
7
(0
.0
96
)
−
0.
13
5
(0
.1
00
)
−
0.
07
5
(0
.1
00
)
M
ar
ri
ed
/l
iv
e
w
it
h
pa
rt
n
er
0.
26
0*
**
(0
.0
59
)
0.
14
1*
*
(0
.0
56
)
0.
03
0
(0
.0
57
)
0.
10
0*
(0
.0
56
)
0.
15
9*
**
(0
.0
56
)
0.
06
6
(0
.0
56
)
0.
07
7
(0
.0
57
)
0.
13
9*
*
(0
.0
57
)
0.
06
1
(0
.0
56
)
H
av
e
de
p.
C
h
ild
re
n
0.
15
9*
**
(0
.0
60
)
0.
20
3*
**
(0
.0
60
)
0.
02
8
(0
.0
62
)
0.
06
9
(0
.0
63
)
0.
03
2
(0
.0
61
)
0.
06
8
(0
.0
61
)
0.
10
5*
(0
.0
62
)
0.
14
2*
*
(0
.0
62
)
0.
07
3
(0
.0
60
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
Ps
eu
do
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
.0
22
9
.0
69
6
.0
14
9
.0
14
4
.0
08
5
.0
05
7
.0
06
9
.0
18
9
.0
26
5
A
IC
70
96
.8
18
75
91
.3
17
70
38
.6
18
72
24
.9
21
76
54
.4
8
72
35
.5
91
74
59
.0
46
74
68
.4
3
74
28
.8
3
B
IC
72
06
.0
51
77
00
.5
49
71
47
.8
5
73
34
.1
54
77
63
.7
13
73
44
.8
24
75
68
.2
79
75
77
.6
63
75
38
.0
63
N
ot
e.
(1
.)
* ,
**
an
d
**
*
in
di
ca
te
st
at
is
ti
ca
ls
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
at
th
e
10
%
,5
%
an
d
1%
le
ve
ls
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
;(
2.
)
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
.
12 ANAND ET AL.
T
A
B
L
E
5
M
ob
ili
ty
im
pa
ir
m
en
t
in
or
de
re
d
pr
ob
it
m
od
el
s
of
su
bj
ec
ti
ve
w
el
lb
ei
n
g
V
ar
ia
bl
es
L
if
e
sa
ti
sf
ac
ti
on
H
ap
p
y
ye
st
er
d
ay
A
n
xi
ou
s
ye
st
er
d
ay
L
if
e
w
or
th
w
h
il
e
Sa
ti
sf
ie
d
w
it
h
fr
ie
n
d
sh
ip
s
Sa
ti
sf
ie
d
w
it
h
co
ll
ea
gu
es
Sa
ti
sf
ie
d
w
it
h
n
ei
gh
bo
u
rh
oo
d
Y
es
te
rd
ay
p
le
as
u
ra
bl
e
M
ob
il
it
y
im
pa
ir
ed
−
0.
46
7*
**
(0
.0
57
)
−
0.
37
1*
**
(0
.0
56
)
0.
12
4*
*
(0
.0
56
)
−
0.
31
5*
**
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
08
0
(0
.0
57
)
−
0.
62
9*
**
(0
.0
61
)
−
0.
20
9*
**
(0
.0
57
)
−
0.
35
5*
**
(0
.0
57
)
A
ge
−
0.
09
8*
**
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
08
0*
**
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
00
6
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
05
3*
*
(0
.0
21
)
−
0.
02
1
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
01
6
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
01
3
(0
.0
22
)
−
0.
07
7*
**
(0
.0
22
)
A
ge
sq
ua
re
d
(0
00
s)
1.
15
8*
**
(0
.2
52
)
0.
94
9*
**
(0
.2
50
)
0.
00
8
(0
.2
51
)
0.
69
9*
**
(0
.2
45
)
0.
37
5
(0
.2
51
)
0.
16
9
(0
.2
55
)
0.
25
3
(0
.2
51
)
0.
96
3*
**
(0
.2
48
)
L
og
ge
d
H
H
eq
ui
v
in
co
m
e
0.
29
2*
**
(0
.0
39
)
0.
21
2*
**
(0
.0
37
)
−
0.
09
8*
**
(0
.0
36
)
0.
23
1*
**
(0
.0
38
)
0.
16
5*
**
(0
.0
37
)
0.
30
8*
**
(0
.0
38
)
0.
17
2*
**
(0
.0
38
)
0.
19
7*
**
(0
.0
36
)
M
al
e
−
0.
06
7
(0
.0
50
)
−
0.
06
5
(0
.0
49
)
−
0.
09
7*
*
(0
.0
49
)
−
0.
15
3*
**
(0
.0
49
)
−
0.
18
0*
**
(0
.0
49
)
0.
02
2
(0
.0
49
)
−
0.
16
9*
**
(0
.0
49
)
−
0.
17
4*
**
(0
.0
49
)
H
ig
h
er
E
du
c.
0.
11
8*
*
(0
.0
53
)
0.
05
4
(0
.0
53
)
0.
15
5*
**
(0
.0
53
)
0.
21
5*
**
(0
.0
53
)
0.
04
7
(0
.0
53
)
0.
10
9*
*
(0
.0
54
)
0.
14
1*
**
(0
.0
53
)
0.
04
0
(0
.0
52
)
W
h
it
e
0.
16
6
(0
.1
31
)
0.
05
5
(0
.1
28
)
0.
02
0
(0
.1
25
)
0.
17
9
(0
.1
28
)
0.
06
4
(0
.1
18
)
0.
00
5
(0
.1
18
)
0.
21
7*
(0
.1
25
)
0.
14
8
(0
.1
24
)
U
n
em
pl
oy
ed
−
0.
30
1*
**
(0
.1
08
)
−
0.
36
7*
**
(0
.1
08
)
0.
13
6
(0
.1
04
)
−
0.
30
5*
**
(0
.1
06
)
0.
02
4
(0
.1
12
)
−
0.
62
1*
**
(0
.1
06
)
−
0.
18
1*
(0
.1
04
)
−
0.
16
2
(0
.1
03
)
M
ar
ri
ed
/l
iv
e
w
it
h
pa
rt
n
er
0.
36
0*
**
(0
.0
55
)
0.
30
6*
**
(0
.0
56
)
−
0.
05
9
(0
.0
55
)
0.
28
4*
**
(0
.0
56
)
0.
17
8*
**
(0
.0
55
)
0.
06
1
(0
.0
57
)
0.
15
0*
**
(0
.0
55
)
0.
25
3*
**
(0
.0
56
)
H
av
e
de
p.
ch
il
dr
en
0.
05
0
(0
.0
58
)
0.
04
4
(0
.0
58
)
−
0.
02
5
(0
.0
60
)
0.
15
9*
**
(0
.0
59
)
−
0.
03
6
(0
.0
59
)
0.
09
5
(0
.0
59
)
0.
02
7
(0
.0
59
)
0.
05
1
(0
.0
57
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
1,
74
0
Ps
eu
do
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
.0
41
1
.0
26
4
.0
04
9
.0
30
3
.0
11
8
.0
46
7
.0
15
5
.0
23
1
A
IC
74
61
.3
92
76
74
.8
82
80
57
.9
37
77
14
.6
11
77
25
.4
53
73
16
.8
9
75
13
.9
8
74
07
.3
54
B
IC
75
70
.6
25
77
84
.1
15
81
67
.1
7
78
23
.8
44
78
34
.6
86
74
26
.1
23
76
23
.2
13
75
16
.5
87
N
ot
e.
(1
.)
* ,
**
an
d
**
*
in
di
ca
te
st
at
is
ti
ca
ls
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
at
th
e
10
%
,5
%
an
d
1%
le
ve
ls
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
;(
2.
)
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
.
A
bb
re
vi
at
io
n
s:
A
IC
,A
ka
ik
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
cr
it
er
io
n
;B
IC
,B
ay
es
ia
n
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
cr
it
er
io
n
;H
H
,h
ou
se
h
ol
d.
ANAND ET AL. 13
this time frame and £306,546 over remaining life expectancy. At a £30,000 ceiling willingness to pay, the corresponding
valuations are £12,828 and £459, 820.14
Taking these results together, our evidence paints a broad picture of differences in quality of life between those with
a mobility impairment and their able-bodied counterparts. Mobility impaired individuals have lower capability and
poorer subjective wellbeing in all measured dimensions. Mobility impaired individuals tend to take part in fewer activi-
ties, but there are a few plausible exceptions including relaxing, self-care and smoking.
4 | DISCUSSION
This paper demonstrates a way of assessing quality of life that operationalises Sen's theoretical framework to obtain a
multidimensional assessment of health status that includes measures of capabilities, activities and wellbeing. Our
empirical results show, inter alia, that in the case of mobility impairment, capabilities are lower in all domains of life,
apart notably from access to health services. The finding probably reflects the universal nature of healthcare entitle-
ments received by this population. But our results also show that psychological costs are high whereas many (though
not all) daily activities are lower. In this regard, they echo those of Flores, Ingenhaag, and Maurer (2015) who, in a
developing country context, concluded that interventions facilitating daily life hold much promise for improving experi-
enced utility among people with disabilities. In our high-income country sample, many daily activities and several mea-
sures of experience are negatively impacted by disability.15 Our theoretical accounting framework suggests that lower
capabilities may be associated with lower, but in some cases higher, levels of activity as a result of substitution effects.
Our empirical results were consistent with this and thereby confirm the value of a theoretical framework that allows
for greater involvement in some activities as capabilities contract. The empirical results also indicate that the psycholog-
ical costs of mobility impairment are high, suggesting that disability can be costly in quality of life terms because so
many aspects of life are affected. They suggest also that the problems of mobility impairment are not ones to which
adaptation is complete.
Taking these results together may help to explain the apparent ineffectiveness of many policies targeting disability.
For example, Kidd, Sloane, and Ferko (2000) found that legislation requiring employers to make workplace adaptations
for people with a disability had little impact on labour market participation. Whilst there may be many reasons for this,
one possibility is that the legislation focussed on only a small subset of the many constraints imposed by disability. Our
14Though direct comparisons are not possible, Powdthavee and van den Berg (2011) find a mental health based valuation of £54,000 for those with
‘problems connected with arms legs hand feet back etc’. These valuations are arguably consistent those previously developed by Kuklys who used
satisfaction with income to estimate a cost equivalent of a quarter of income or more.
15From the original Senian perspective, activities that people have reason to value, and experiences on which they have reflected, such as judgments
about life satisfaction, can be viewed as providing complementary evidence about different qualities of life. It is sometimes forgotten that although
Sen emphasises capabilities, his original formal scheme explicitly allows for utility or happiness. We highlight the fact that if preferences are adaptive
(von Weizsacker, 2005), then life satisfaction based methods may underestimate the value of losses due to disability.
TABLE 6 Valuations of mobility impairment based on life satisfaction (LS) and Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs) lost models
Estimated Valuation (£) Annual QALYs lost and values (95% CI) QALYs lost until death (95% CI)
LS value–linear
model
£42,749
LS value–log model £78,877
QALYs lost 0.428 (0.398, 0.457) 15.327 (14.263,16.392)
QALY value (£20,000) £8,552 (£7,958, £9,146) £306,546 (£285,260, £327,833)
QALY value (£30,000) £12,828 (£11,937, £13,718) £459,820 (£427,889, £491,750)
Note. (1.) By definition, an individual's EQ-5D-3L variable is equal to the amount by which their life years are weighted to obtain their esti-
mated QALYs. Our estimate of 0.428 annual QALYs lost due to impairment is the coefficient on mobility impairment in an unreported ordi-
nary least square (OLS) model of EQ-5D-3L. This model, which is available from the authors upon request, controls for age, age-squared, log
income, gender, education, ethnicity, employment status, marital status and having dependent children. QALYs lost until death is estimated
by multiplying this figure by remaining life expectancy. Remaining Life expectancy is estimated by subtracting mean age of full sample
(45.654) from general population average life expectancy of 81.5 years. No adjustment made for possible reduced life expectancy arising from
implications or comorbidities relating to mobility impairment.
Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval.
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evidence, by contrast, points in the direction of a more comprehensive approach to disability policy that might include
workplace issues but also social resources and environmental context. Paradoxically, the fact that many areas of life
appear negatively affected gives policymakers and practitioners many potential options and levers to consider when
designing interventions to mitigate these losses.
The capability approach emphasises diversity. Recent disability policy changes in Australia appear to share this per-
spective by taking a personalised approach to disability in which important capabilities, such as the ability to access
decent work, are established by understanding the individual's situation in some detail (National Disability
Services, undated). The argument on which the Disability Care Australia policy is based is that by understanding what
a person can or cannot do, and all the social as well as financial resources to which they have access, forms of support
can be developed that maintain economic and social functioning more effectively and at lower cost. The issue of
unsustainable disability program costs is one that has been given some prominence in the USA also, for example,
Autor (2011), and only time will tell whether the new Australian reforms will be effective for people with disability
and/or taxpayers. If they are, then understanding a disabled person's capabilities systematically, as illustrated here, will
be a central feature of the policy's implementation.
Our findings may contribute to debates about the measurement of health also. To date, QALY measures have
tended to focus on capturing the health status benefits of health interventions of populations (Gold, Stevenson, &
Fryback, 2002), and this gives rise to the possibility of bias due to the omission of many potential nonhealth benefits of
‘health’ interventions (Anand & Hanson, 1997 p. 699). For example, appropriate software and a fast internet connection
that allows a mobility impaired individual to work from home does not affect health status per se but could have a dra-
matic impact on overall quality of life. Such changes in the capability set can be recorded with our approach but are not
easily measured or even detected by QALYs. One aspect of this concerns adaptation: the EQ-5D-5L asks whether a per-
son has ‘difficulties doing my usual activities’, a benchmark that may inevitably adapt over time, resulting in underesti-
mation of the value of interventions that help an individual engage in daily activities.16 Although the present study
suggests that adaptation does not exercise a strong effect, longitudinal data would be needed to investigate such an
effect comprehensively. Capability approaches to health measurement may also contribute to the development of health
measures where standard measures are either not feasible or lead to particularly controversial results. For example,
standard QALY indices of health for very young children have been difficult to develop (Grosse, Prosser, Asakawa, &
Feeny, 2010), whereas direct capability indicators based on parental or clinical assessment already exist.17 Similarly, at
the other end of the age spectrum, there are questions about the normative desirability or practicability of using QALY
measures to assess the value of end of life care, for example in the presence of cognitive decline (Round, 2012). A capa-
bility approach could avoid at least some of these problems by identifying quality of life aspects that are particularly val-
ued at that stage in life.
In our empirical results, we offered two sets of monetary estimates of the quality of life impact of mobility impair-
ment in our sample. Estimates for other events, using the same life satisfaction method, have ranged from $156 for a
10Ku increase in aircraft noise to £206,000 for the loss of a spouse (Oswald & Powdthavee, 2008b), which plausibly
locates our results (£43,000 to £79,000) for disability as being material but not extreme. The time period to which these
estimates relate is somewhat ambiguous, being derived from annual earnings, and consequently, it is unsurprising that
the estimates lie between the annual monetized QALY loss (£8,552 to £12,828) and the estimated loss over the
remaining lifetime of participants (£306,546 and £459,820). Clearly, much further work remains to be done in this area,
but these monetary valuations do offer another yardstick for measuring the magnitude of the quality of life effects we
are addressing in the empirical example.
It can be questioned whether Sen's capability approach is compatible with a general and familiar utility approach.18
It has not been our been purpose to explore this issue, and in general, if a theoretical utility function is allowed to be
defined generally enough, then anything is compatible with it. However, our analyses and evidence might be taken as
suggesting more compatibility than some realise. If for example, Sen's (1985) original three equations are accepted, then
conventional utility analysis could be seen as a special case of a more general approach to quality of life in which a per-
son's wellbeing is assessed not just in terms of their behaviour and existential states, and their experiential values of
them, but also of their positive freedoms. However, Sen's approach, a little like that of Rawls, brings with it things that
16Hernandez-Alva and Pudney (2017) find significant differences in QALY rankings even when the informational basis is changed simply by
expanding response categories.
17See the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey - https://www.diw.de/en.
18We are grateful to one of the referees for this point.
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utility analysis does not. For example, he emphasises the importance of public deliberation19 about social choices
whereas utility-based welfare economics has, historically, been more agnostic about the need or value of public deliber-
ation instead opting for valuations implicit in market transactions or using stated trade-off methods. The view this
paper illustrates is that the practical value to analysts of the approach Sen advocates is that it enriches the way we
explicitly think about aspects of value.
Finally, there are several limits of this paper that could be addressed in future research. It would be useful to com-
pare different levels of mobility impairment or other disabilities to understand how capabilities, functionings and sub-
jective wellbeing vary across a range of subgroups. It would also be useful know more about the use of assistive
technologies and their capacity to improve the different aspects of life quality used here. Furthermore, though psycho-
metric properties of capabilities are now becoming available, it would be useful to know more about them for this par-
ticular subgroup. The capability indicators reported here are still relatively novel but could easily be incorporated into
evaluations of clinical interventions, which would help to address a range of follow-on issues that arise from applying
the approach to mobility impairment. That said, the evidence from these data is that the costs of mobility impairment
are neither trivial nor concentrated in just a few aspects of life while theory can allow for the fact that a possible result
of capability deprivation will be that a few inferior functionings will increase.
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